MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES CAN PLAY OFF MOST GOVERNMENTS TO MINIMISE THEIR TAX PAYMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONALLY COORDINATED FISCAL POLICIES. WITHOUT A SUPRANATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, MOST TAX HARMONIZATION POLICIES ARE UNSTABLE BECAUSE ONE OR ANOTHER SIGNATORY ALWAYS HAS AN INCENTIVE TO BREAK RANKS.
THE ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO SHOW HOW THE APPLICATION OF A "RATIONAL CHOICE" MODEL OF ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING TO THE 1973 NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY ELECTION CAMPAIGN POINTS TO SOME NEED FOR A REORIENTATION OF THIS APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO BASIC REASON WHY THE MODEL CANNOT BE MADE TO WORK IN AN "IRRATIONAL" SITUATION. ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR ARE DISCUSSED.
PARTY LEADERS MAY ENTER INTO COMMITMENTS TO COALITION PARTNERS THAT INVOLVE OBLIGATIONS TO IMPOSE INTRAPARTY DISCIPLINE. LEADERS MAY DO THIS WITH GREATER OR LESSER ENTHUSIASM, AND THE REQUIRED DISCIPLINE MAY OR MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING, THUS, GOVERNMENTS MAY BE DEFEATED IN LEGISLATIVE VOTES BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE FAILS TO HONOR OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO BY THE EXECUTIVE. THIS PAPER OFFERS A SIMPLE MODEL OF THIS PROCESS, BEGINS TO ANALYZE IT, AND ELABORATES A RECENT REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE OF THE PHENOMENON.
THE AUTHOR REFLECTS ON THE SCHOLARSHIP OF NORMAN SCHOFIELD, FOCUSING ON "POLITICAL COMPETITION AND MULTIPARTY COALITION GOVERNMENTS." IN THIS ESSAY, SCHOFIELD OFFERED A COMPETITIVE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF MULTIPARTY COALITION BEHAVIOR.
Reviews and discusses `Political competitions and multiparty coalitions governments', which appeared in vol.23 (1993), pp.1-33 of this journal. Includes a response by the original author.
THIS RESEARCH REPORTS THE RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF PARTY POLICY POSITIONS AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT CABINET PORTFOLIOS IN JAPAN AT THE TIME OF THE 1996 GENERAL ELECTION. THE SURVEY REPLICATES EARLIER EXPERT SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN A WIDE RANGE OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS BY LAVER AND HUNT (1992), BUT USES A SURVEY FORM ADAPTED TO THE SPECIFIC JAPANESE CONTEXT, TRANSLATED INTO JAPANESE, AND ADMINISTERED FROM A JAPANESE ACADEMIC INSTITUTION. THE RESULTS PROVIDE RAW DATA THAT CAN BE USED AS INPUT TO A RANGE OF DIFFERENT MODELS OF PARTY COMPETITION AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION.
AMERICA IS THOUGHT TO BE AN EXCEPTIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND, IN MANY OF ITS PARTICULARS, IT CERTAINLY DIFFERS FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOUND IN MOST OF THE WORLD'S DEMOCRACIES. ITS SEPARATION-OF-POWERS REGIME IS THOUGHT TO HAVE SPAWNED, IN RECENT DECADES, THE PHENOMENON OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT IN WHICH PARTISAN CONTROL OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE MAJOR PARTIES. BY IMPLICATION, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS ROBUST REGULARITY IN WHICH DEMOCRATS CONTROL THE LEGISLATURE AND THE REPUBLICANS THE EXECUTIVE IS A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND, THEREFORE, DISTINGUISHES AMERICA FROM ITS PARLIAMENTARY COUNTERPARTS ELSEWHERE. IN THIS ARTICLE, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES, TOO, EXPERIENCE DIVIDED GOVERNMENT. THUS, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT PER SE DOES NOT DISTINGUISH PARLIAMENTARY AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS REGIMES. WHAT DOES, HOWEVER, ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF THIS PHENOMENON: DIVIDED GOVERNMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED IN PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES WHEREAS THEY ARE MANDATED ELECTORALLY IN SEPARATION-OF-POWERS REGIMES.
